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No question of jurisdiction is probably more interesting than
the novel one that is sometimes raised over salvage. In fact,
the question has been so rarely up for decision that I shall have
to take you somewhat into the realm of speculation in this arti-
cle, as many of the questions that I shall suggest have never
been decided.
If a disabled vessel is found, abandoned, and is brought in
by salvors, admittedly an action to recover salvage would have
to be brought in the United States District Court. For the
action would have to be in rem against the vessel, which is
purely an Admiralty right, no common law court having the
power to grant such an action. The situation would be the
same if the disabled vessel had a crew on board if no one made
an agreement for the service of rescuing the vessel.
If, however, the owners of the vessel or the captain should
agree to pay to be taken in, a contract would have been made
and the owner of the salving vessel would probably have the
right to proceed at common law against the captain and owners
of the vessel saved, as well as the right to proceed either in rem
or inpersonam in Admiralty.
The Judiciary Act of 1889, Section 9, U. S. Revised Stat-
utes, 1878, Section 563, Clause 8, defining the jurisdiction of the
District Courts of the United States, provides:-
Of all causes in Admiralty and Maritime jurisdiction saving to suitors
in a&? cases the right to a common law remedy where the commbn law is
competent to give it.
It is true that the Supreme Court has prepared rules gov-
erning procedure and practice in Admiralty, and its Rule x9
says this of salvage:
In all suits for salvage the suit may be it. rem against the property saved
or the proceeds thereof, or in fiersonam against the party at whose request
and for whose benefit the salvage service has been performed.
But this rule in no way abrogates the clear right given by
the Judiciary Act to a common law remedy where the common
law is competent to give it.
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Is not the common law competent to give a remedy to a suit
on a contract to work on a disabled vessel and try and rescue
her for an agreed price? Where would be the difference between
such a contract and one to build a lighthouse for an agreed
price? Would the situation be different if the contract to work
on a disabled vessel with the hopes of saving her was to be paid
for at so much a day? It wouldn't be if it were applied to the
building of a lighthouse-why should it then when applied to the
vessel? Both are contracts. But it may be said such work is
dependent upon success for pay, so it is in a purely salvage suit,
but just because compensation for the rescuing of a vessel where
no contract has been made is dependent upon success and the
saving of some property, it is no reason either by analogy or
otherwise, why, where one agreed to pay either a lump sum or
by day's pay for trying to bring in a disabled vessel that it
should be dependent upon success unless success were made part
of the contract.
Men who go out inder a contract for trying to tow in a ves-
sel stranded on the coast are popularly termed salvors, but they
are really only workmen and are in no different position in the
law from stone masons who go out to build a lighthouse.
There is no logical reason why the pay of one in such a case
should any more depend upon success than the pay of the other.
If the lighthouse should blow down after being nearly com-
pleted, through no fault of the stone masons, they would be
entitled to their pay just the same. In what different position,
then, would the men be who went out to try and rescue the ves-
sel even if they were not successful? They would be just as
much entitled to pay under their contract as the stone masons
would under theirs. But they would be entitled to no reward if
successful as the element which enters into salvage cases is
entirely eliminated by the contract.
It would therefore seem that if a vessel is rescued, no con-
tract being made, the action would be exclusively in the
Admiralty Court, but where a contract is made it may be either
prosecuted in the Admiralty Court or in a Court of Common
Law.
A little different situation arises where a vessel is sunk in a
harbor or bay within easy access to the shore and no element of
danger enters into the work in rescuing her. In such cases it
has been held that the services rendered were not salvage ser-
vices and that no lien for such services could be had against the
vessel. I
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If such services were rendered without contract, undoubt-
edly under these decisions, the case would have to be brought in
.personam in the Admiralty Court, but if a contract had been
made the courts holding that in such cases the services were
not salvage services, the action could certainly be brought at
common law if the party so elected.
If the reasoning of these two cases2 is applied to the sup-
posed case of the vessel stranded on the coast, and she were res-
cued without danger to the workmen and the vessel employed in
the work, it would not be a salvage service and no lien would lie
against the salved vessel, but it cannot be that the court intended
these two cases to imply that the law goes quite so far as to say
that in every case, even in a harbor, where a vessel is rescued,
no lien attaches for the work, for if an unknown vessel is
sunk in a harbor and is raised without the slightest danger to
the workmen, they at the time not knowing to whom she belongs,
they would only have an action in rem.
Note: The cases cite?[ below are not meant, in every instance, to fully
support the text, but should be read for a thorough understanding of the
subject.
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